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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Chantel Tucker appeals, contending that the Idaho Supreme Court deprived her
of due process by denying her request for transcripts, made both in her amended notice
of appeal and in a subsequent motion to augment the record. She also contends that
the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over her, or
alternatively, by not reducing her sentence sua sponte when it did so.

The State

responds, contending that Ms. Tucker's due process rights were not violated and the
district court did not abuse its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker.
Specifically in regard to Ms. Tucker's argument regarding the district court's failure to
reduce her sentence sua sponte, the State asserts that issue is not properly before this
Court, as it must have been raised as fundamental error because Ms. Tucker did not
affirmatively request that the district court reduce her sentence sua sponte.

Ms. Tucker

deems this reply necessary to address that final contention; the State's other responses
are unremarkable.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Tucker's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court denied Ms. Tucker due process and equal protection
when it denied her request in the Amended Notice of Appeal to include
transcripts necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

2.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Tucker due process and equal
protection when it denied her motion to augment the record with transcripts
necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction
over Ms. Tucker, or, alternatively, by not reducing her sentences when it did so.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Denied Ms. Tucker Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied Her Request In The Amended Notice Of Appeal To Include Transcripts
Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal
Ms. Tucker acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court recently issued its
opinion in State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 218-20 (2014), which addressed several of
the issues raised in her Appellant's Brief on this argument.

However, as the State's

response in this regard is not remarkable, no further reply in this regard is necessary.
She simply refers this Court back to pages 9-14 of her Appellant's Brief.

11.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Tucker Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review
Of The Issues On Appeal
Ms. Tucker acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court recently issued its
opinion in Easley, 156 Idaho at 218-20, which addressed several of the issues raised in
her Appellant's Brief on this argument. However, as the State's response in this regard
is not remarkable, no further reply in this regard is necessary. She simply refers this
Court back to pages 13-14 of her Appellant's Brief.
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111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Ms. Tucker, Or, Alternatively, By Not Reducing Her Sentences When It Did So

A.

The Fundamental Error Doctrine Does Not, And Should Not, Apply To
Ms. Tucker's Argument That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not
Reducing her Sentence Sua Sponte When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over Her
Ms. Tucker recognizes that the Court of Appeals recently held that challenges to

the failure to reduce a sentence sua sponte are subject to analysis under
the fundamental error rule if there was no objection or motion below. State v. Clontz,
P.3d

2014 WL 2119164, p.4 (Ct. App. May 22, 2014), pet. review filed.

However, as Clontz is not yet final, it is not controlling on this case. 1 Moreover, there
are two main reasons why the State's argument to apply the fundamental error standard
should be rejected:

(1) the decision to not reduce a sentence upon relinquishing

jurisdiction constitutes an adverse ruling against the defendant, and therefore, it is
properly challenged for the first time on appeal; and (2) given the limitations on the
ability to file multiple Rule 35 motions, adopting the State's position would lead to the
filing of preventative appeals, and such an exercise has already been deemed to be a
useless waste of resources.

In the event that the pending petition for review in Clontz is denied before this case is
decided, Ms. Tucker would contend, for the same reasons discussed herein, that Clontz
should be rejected (should the Idaho Supreme Court retain this case) or overruled
(should this case be assigned to the Court of Appeals), as it is manifestly wrong, unjust,
and unwise, and so, overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious legal principles
of law and remedy injustice. See, e.g. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of
Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592-93 (2006) (reaffirming the standard for considering whether
to overrule precedent).
1
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As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, "[t]o properly raise an issue on appeal
there must

an adverse ruling by the court below or the issue must have been

raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397 (2003) (emphasis added); see also
State v. OuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (considering the merits of an argument on
appeal, even though that argument had not been formally made to the district court
because the district court had addressed the issue).

In regard to the decision to

relinquish jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals has explained that part of the decision is
whether the sentence should be reduced or executed as is:
At the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court may suspend the
sentence and place the defendant on probation, or may relinquish
jurisdiction, allowing execution of the original sentence. If jurisdiction is
relinquished, the court may also reduce the sentence at that time. It is a
common practice for a trial court to impose a rather severe underlying
sentence as an incentive for the defendant to perform well in the retained
jurisdiction program and to comply with the probation terms if the
defendant is ultimately placed on probation. A lengthy underlying sentence
also preserves the judge's options until such time as probation may be
denied or revoked, when the court can decide whether the sentence
should be reduced. A long underlying sentence thus provides the judge a
hedge against the uncertainty of the defendant's future performance.
State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added). Therefore, one
of the decisions the district court must affirmatively make when relinquishing jurisdiction
is determining "what prison sentence should be ordered[.] Specifically, if a prison
sentence previously has been pronounced but suspended, should that sentence be
ordered into execution or should the court order a reduced sentence as authorized by
I.C.R. 35?" State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054 (Ct. App. 1989).
Thus, by ordering the underlying sentence into effect without modification, the
district court has affirmatively decided that the sentence should not be reduced. As a
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result, that adverse decision is properly challenged on appeal, even though no objection
was made below.

McPheters, 138 Idaho at 397; DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553.

Therefore, the State's argument that this issue needs to be addressed under the
fundamental error framework is misplaced.
Even if the fundamental error doctrine could apply in this context, it should not,
since applying that doctrine would have unacceptable adverse consequences on the
appellate system. As the Court of Appeals has long since held, a defendant need not
object to the length of her sentence when it is initially imposed in order to preserve a
challenge

to the length of her sentence on appeal after the sentence has been

executed.

Adams, 115 Idaho 1053. In Adams, the State argued, "if a sentence is

pronounced but suspended, and no appeal is taken immediately from that judgment, the
defendant has waived any claim that the sentence is excessive."

Id. at 1055. The

Court of Appeals rejected that argument, pointing out:
Were we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is
waived if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing
but suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file
preventative appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday
might be revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise.
Neither do we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases.

Id. at 1055-56. The State's argument in this case promotes a similar position, which will
have similarly undesirable results. Since defendants would have to hold onto their only
other tool to challenge the initial imposition of sentence (a Rule 35 motion for leniency)
in order to preserve an appellate challenge to the sentence that might ultimately be
executed after a potential subsequent decision to revoke probation or relinquish
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jurisdiction, their only opinion to challenge the initial imposition of sentence would be
through an appeal from the judgment of conviction.2
The reason the defendant would have to preserve her Rule 35 motion in this
manner is because a defendant can only file one Rule 35 motion requesting leniency in
a criminal case. 3

I.C.R. 35(b); see, e.g., State v. Atwood, 122 Idaho 199, 200-201

(Ct. App. 1992).

Therefore, if a defendant has to use her one Rule 35 motion

requesting leniency in order to preserve an appellate challenge to the sentence
executed upon relinquishment of jurisdiction or revocation of probation, as the State's
position would require, she would be unable to use that motion to request leniency after
the initial imposition of sentence. As a result, her only option to challenge the initial
imposition of sentence would be to file a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction
which either retains jurisdiction or imposes a period of probation as a hedge against the
possibility that the district court might order a prison sentence at some future point.

Compare Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56 (rejecting a similar argument leading to the

These preventative appeals would appear in both the probation and retained
jurisdiction contexts because the district court has the same authority to reduce a
sentence sua sponte when it revokes probation as when it relinquishes jurisdiction.
Compare State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008) (recognizing this authority in the
probation revocation context), with State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App.
2003) (recognizing this authority in the relinquishment context). Therefore, adopting the
State's argument on fundamental error in this case not only leads to unnecessary
preventative appeals being filed in future cases where the district court retains
jurisdiction, but in future cases where the district court suspends a sentence as well.
3 In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that an oral request for sentence
reduction at the time the district court relinquishes jurisdiction consumes that one and
only motion for leniency. See State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 728 (2013), reh'g denied.
As a result, the State's argument that the defendant should at least "ask the sentencing
court to consider a further reduction of sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction" (Resp.
Br., p.17) still requires the defendant to have retained her one and only Rule 35 motion,
or else, such a request would constitute an impermissible second motion for leniency.
2
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same result). However, forcing a defendant to file such an appeal makes little sense,
since the only "genuinely meaningful" sentence is the one which is actually executed.

Id. at 1055.
Essentially, under the State's position, the courts would be faced with multiple
appeals challenging a single sentence - one from the initially-imposed sentence and
one from the ultimately-executed sentence. Adopting the State's position also means
that the appellate courts could easily end up addressing a multitude of cases where the
district court retains jurisdiction and ultimately places the defendant on probation, since
the notice of appeal to challenge the initial imposition of sentence will necessarily be
filed before the ultimate decision to suspend the sentence after tt1e period of retained
jurisdiction is made. Therefore, just as the Adams Court rejected the State's argument
leading promoting a system filled with undesirable preventative appeals, so too should
this Court reject the State's argument in this case which would lead to the same
unacceptable result.
Finally, the State's argument - that the only way to preserve a challenge to the
district court's decision to not reduce a sentence sua sponte is to have trial counsel
request the district court to exercise its sua sponte authority (Resp. Br., p.2) - stretches
language to its breaking point. The term "sua sponte" literally means "[o]f his or its own
will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion." The Law Dictionary:
Featuring

Black's

Law

Dictionary

Free

Online

Legal

Dictionary

2d

ed.,

http://thelawdictionary.org/sua-sponte/ (last visited July 1, 2014) (emphasis added); see
also Syth v. Parke, 121 Idaho 156, 161 (1990) ("That action, taken sua sponte by the

district court was to, on its own motion, reconsider a decision it had earlier reached on
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a party's motion.") (emphasis added); State v. Dennard, 102 Idaho 824, 826 (1982)
("Therefore, when the court dismissed sua sponte, there was a motion made, albeit the
court's own

, and I.AR. 11 (c)(3) is applicable.") (emphasis added). Thus, by its

very definition, the district court cannot use its sua sponte authority upon the motion of a
party. 4 Therefore, the State's argument should be rejected as irrational, as it ignores
the literal definition of the principles at issue.
As such, this Court should consider Ms. Tucker's challenges to the district court's
decision to relinquish jurisdiction and execute her sentence without modification on their
merits.

B.

Considering The Merits Of The Argument In Regard To The District Court's
Decision To Not Reduce Ms. Tucker's Sentence Sua Sponte, The Record
Reveals That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
The State's arguments on the merits of these claims are unremarkable, and so,

no further reply is necessary. As such, this Court should reduce Ms. Tucker's sentence
as it deems appropriate, or remand the case for a reduction of sentence pursuant to
I.C.R. 35 for the reasons set forth in the Appellant's brief. (See App. Br., pp.15-22.)

Rather, the State's proposed solution constitutes a traditional motion pursuant to Rule
35, see, e.g., Brunet , 155 Idaho at 728, and therefore, requires the defendant to have
preserved her Rule 35 motion. Thus, the State's proposed solution is not an effective
solution and only leads to all the problems discussed supra.
4
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Tucker respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Tucker respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand this case
for an order placing her on probation. Alternatively, she requests that this Court reduce
her sentences as it deems appropriate, or remand the case for a reduction of sentence
pursuant to I.C.R. 35.
DATED this 8th day of July, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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